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missible, '' [ e] vidence must correspond with the substance of
the material allegations, and be relevant to the question in
dispute." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1868.) "Irrelevant matter,
though pleaded, is still irrelevant.'' (Crowell v. City of Riverside, 26 Cal.App.2d 566, 583 [80 P.2d 120].) [14] The
materiality of evidence is a question of law and a wide discretion is left to the trial judge in determining its admissibility. (Spolter v. Fottr-Wheel Brake Serv. Co., 99 Cal.App.
2d 690, 699 [222 P.2d 307] ; Moody v. Peirano, 4 Cal.App.
411, 418 [ 88 P. 380] . ) His ruling thereon, in the absence
of an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed upon appeal.
(Estate of Ades, 81 Cal.App.2d 334, 342 [184 P.2d 1] .)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.

[L. A. No. 22066. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1952.]

DAVID MORGAN NORRIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY (a Corporation),
Respondent; ZURICH GENERAL ACCIDENT AND
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Cross-Defendant and Appellant.
[la, lb] Automobiles- Insurance- Persons Included in Omnibus
Clause.-Under omnibus clause of insurance policy issued to
owner of automobile declaring that word "insured" includes
the named insured, any person while using the car and any
person or organization legally responsible for use thereof,
provided the actual use is by the named insured or with his
permission, a companion of the owner's son driving the car
with the permission of such son at the time it collided with
another vehicle is not an additional insured, where the owner
had given his son permission to use the car but expressly
prohibited him from lending it or permitting its use by any
other person except a member of the family or the chauffeur,
the matter of the owner's imputed liability under Veh. Code,
§ 402, not being involved in the case.
:McK. Dig. Reference: [1-6] Automobiles, § 68-1.
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[2] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Use of
automobile by a third person is not protected by an omnibus
clause in an insurance policy where the owner has expressly
forbidden it.
[3] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-A permittee's delegation of permission for use of an automobile
without the express or implied permission of the insured is not
within the omnibus coverage of an automobile liability policy
unless the third party's operation of the car serves some
purpose of the. original permittee.
[4] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Where
a permittee in his operation of an automobile used the vehicle
contrary to instructions or where against instructions he gave
the operation over to another for the permittee's benefit, the
permittee is the person responsible for the operation of the
vehicle with permission and therefore an insured under the
omnibus clause of an automobile liability policy.
[5] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Where
there was a course of conduct indicating assent by the insured
to use of automobile by others than the permittee, the user
is deemed to be the responsible person with permission and
an additional insured under the omnibus clause of an automobile liability policy.
[6] Id.~Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Where
the facts show neither express nor implied permission for the
permittee's delegation of the use of an automobile to another,
the third person is not the responsible person with permission
and therefore not protected by the omnibus clause of an
automobile liability policy.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed.
Action on an automobile insurance policy. Judgment for
defendant affirmed.
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and Raymond G. Stanbury for Appellants.
[2] Omnibus clause of automobile liability policy as covering
accidents caused by third person who is using car with consent
of permittee of named insured, note, 160 A.L.R. 1195, 1209. Permission or consent to employee's use of car within meaning of
omnibus coverage clause, note, 5 A.L.R.2d 600, 657. See, also,
Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Automobiles, § 96; Am.Jur., Automobiles,
§ 534 et seq.
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,Jennings & Belcher, Stevens l<'argo and Louis E. Kearney
for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-David Morgan Norris and Irvin Victor Norris are father and minor son. They are or are about to be
defendants in an action to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage sustained by Mr. and Mrs. Leo
Phillipson in an automobile accident. At the time of the
accident the plaintiff Irvin was driving a Plymouth automobile owned by E. A. Parkford. This action is for declaratory relief to determine the respective rights and duties of
the plaintiffs and the defendant Pacific Indemnity Company,
herein called Pacific, under the insurance policy issued by
it to the owner Parkford. Pacific cross-complained against
the plaintiffs and against Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, insurer of the senior Norris who
signed Irvin's application for an operator's license (Veh.
Code, § 352) .
The facts as found by the court are based on evidence
which is without substantial conflict. Parkford had given
his son, Geoffrey, permission to use the Plymouth but expressly prohibited him from lending it to or permitting its
use by any other person except a member of the family or
the chauffeur. On April 3, 1950, Geoffrey and Irvin went
to Newport Beach in the Plymouth. While they were at a
friend's home Irvin wanted to borrow a car to drive to the
nearby town for a haircut. Geoffrey had not previously
loaned the Plymouth to anyone, but upon request he gave
Irvin the keys saying, "Irv, I am not supposed to loan the
car. For God's sake, be careful." When Irvin left the barber
shop in the Plymouth to meet the other boys, he collided with
an automobile in which the Phillipsons were riding.
The question before the trial court was whether Irvin was
an additional assured under the policy of Pacific which was
introduced in evidence; and therefore whether Pacific was
obligated to answer for a judgment as against him and to
defend the personal injury action on his behalf. The trial
court found that Irvin did not have the permission of the
owner express or implied and concluded that he was not
an additional assured. Judgment followed for Pacific on
the complaint and the cross-complaint accordingly. The plaintiffs and cross-defendants appealed.
The appeal presents the question of the correctness of the
trial court's declaration that Irvin was not an additional
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assured under Pacific's policy. For the purpose of determining that issue the correctness of the finding that Geoffrey
had no authority to loan the automobile, in fact was expressly
prohibited from doing so, and therefore that Irvin had no
actual permission of the owner, is unquestioned.
The so-called omnibus clause of the policy issued to the
owner by Pacific provides that "the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and also includes any
person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual
use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his
permission.''
No difficulty arises as to the meaning of the word "permission" in the policy. It may be assumed that it means
permission, express or implied. (See Veh. Code, § 415a(2).)
The problem involves the application of the policy provision.
The plaintiffs contend that the omnibus clause attaches to
fix liability on the insurer in this case, as the statutory provision attached to fix the owner's imputed liability under
section 402 of the Vehicle Code in Souza v. Corti (1943), 22
Cal.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861].
Section 402 of the Vehicle Code provides that every owner
of a motor vehicle is liable for death or injury to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of the
vehicle by any person using or operating it with the owner's
permission express or implied, and that the negligence of
such person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes
of civil damages. The section places a limitation of $5,000/
10,000 public liability and $1,000 property damage in one
accident.
In Souza v. Corti, supra, Arthur Gigli had permission to
use his father's ,Dodge automobile. In violation of instructions prohibiting the use or operation of the car by another,
he delegated operation thereof to the defendant Corti. In
a personal injury action against Corti and the Giglis, father
and son, judgment was rendered against Corti alone and
in favor of the other defendants. The appeal of the plaintiffs involved the correctness of the implied finding that there
was no imputed liability of the owner pursuant to section
402 of the Vehicle Code. In reversing the judgment as to
the Giglis this court used the following language (22 Cal.2d
at pp. 460-461) : "In the present case the use which was
being made of the borrowed car at the time of the accident
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was the use which was contemplated by the owner. Any secret
restrictions imposed by him on the manner of its use do not
negative the controlling fact that it was being used with the
owner's permission at the time of the accident. Violations
of such restrictions may not be said to cause a revocation
of the permission. Liability of the defendant owner in this
case pursuant to section 402 of the Vehicle Code is. therefore established. . . .
''As to the liability of the defendant Arthur Gigli, the
record shows that defendant Corti took possession of the
Dodge for the use, benefit and accommodation and under the
direction of Arthur and for the purpose of taking it to Rocca's
for Arthur. Under these circumstances Arthur was the principal and Corti was his agent. The negligence of the latter
was therefore imputable to Arthur. (Maberto v. Wolfe, 106
Cal.App. 202 [289 P. 218] .) "
Thus in the Souza case the owner's permittee, Arthur Gigli,
was held to have been the user of the car with the owner's
permission at the time of the injury to the plaintiff.
[la] Section 402 is not involved in the present case. The
plaintiffs are not concerned with fastening imputed liability
on the owner. They are not the beneficiaries of any statutory
created liability. The plaintiffs seek to apply the policy language as a source of financial discharge of Irvin's liability
to the persons injured through his own negligence. But
Irvin's financial protection of his ability to discharge his
liability for his negligent acts is his own concern unless his
use or operation of the automobile was with the express or
implied permission of the owner. Unquestionably as found
by the court Irvin did not have the permission of the owner,
either express or implied, for the use or operation of the
car. Protection under an owner's insurance policy to the
user or operator of the owner's automobile depends on his
having obtained the express or implied permission of the
owner.
The contract language is plain. The plaintiffs would nevertheless apply the determination in Souza v. Corti, supra, as
it may affect an owner's imputed liability, to obtain coverage
under the owner's policy for one who was not his permittee.
As support for this position they invoke the principle that
in construing insurance contracts the words expressing the
intention of the parties should be given a meaning settled
by judicial decision. The invoked principle applies to judicial
construction of insurance policies. (Appleman, Insurance
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I..aw & Practice, vol. 13, § 7404, p. 104 et seq.; Fidelity &
Cas. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 1, 7
[100 P.2d 364].) 'l'he invoked rule, insofar as it is applicable,
produces an interpretation of the word "permission" to include permission, express or implied. But it does not make
one a permittee who had neither the express nor implied permission of the owner for the use or operation of the automobile.
'l'here is no decision in this state which construes or applies
similar language in insurance policies in accordance with the
plaintiff's contentions. Nor do decisions in other jurisdictions relied on justify a conclusion that Irvin is an additional assured under the owner's policy.
[2] It is held generally that the use by a third person is
not protected by an omnibus clause in an insurance policy
where the owner has expressly forbidden it. (Samuels v.
AmeTican Auto Ins. Co., 150 F.2d 221 [160 A.L.R. 1191],
and annotation p. 1195 at 1209, et seq., and cases cited; note,
5 A.L.R.2d 657 and cases cited.) [3] The weight of authority is said to follow the rule that a permittee's delegation
of permission for the use of the car without the express or
implied permission of the assured is not within the omnibus
coverage unless the third party's operation of the car serves
some purpose of the original permittee. (5 Am.Jur., Automobiles § 535.1 Cum.Supp. p. 155, and references; see, also,
CaTd v. CommeTcial Cas. Ins. Co., 20 Tenn.App. 132 [95
S.W.2d 1281] ; AmeTican Auto Ins. Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn.
605 [45 S.W.2d 52]; Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wn.2d 533 [197
P.2d 999] .) [4] Where the permittee in his operation used
the vehicle contrary to instructions or where against instructions he gave the operation over to another for the permittee's
benefit, the courts have held the permittee to be the person
responsible for the operation of the vehicle with permission
and therefore an assured under the policy. (O'Roak v. Lloyds
Cas. Co., 285 Mass. 532 [189 N.E. 571]; Guzenfield v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 133 [190 N.E. 23] ; Boudreau v. Maryland Cas. Co., 287 Mass. 423 [192 N.E. 38] ; Blair v. TTavelers'
Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 285 [192 N.E. 467] ; State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 186 Va. 658 [43 S.E.2d 863, 5 A.L.R.
2d 594] ; cf. Dickinson v. G1·eat Am. Indem. Co., 296 Mass.
368 [6N.E.2d439].) [5] Likewisewheretherewasacourse
of conduct indicating assent by the assured to use by others
than the permittee, the user is deemed to be the responsible
person with permission and an additional assured.· (Odden
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v. Union Indern. Co., 156 Wash. 10 [286 P. 59, 72 A.L.R.
1363]; cf. Trotter v. Union Indern. Co., (D.C.) 33 F.2d 363,
aff 'd 35 F .2d 104, arising out of the same accident; Boyer
v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 359 [178 N.E.
523]; Hinton v. Indemn,ity Ins. Co., 175 Va. 205 [8 S.E.2d
279] .) [6] But where the facts as here showed neither express
nor implied permission for the permittee's delegation of the use
of the car to another, the third person has been held not to
be the responsible person with permission and therefore not
protected by the omnibus clause. (Johnson v. 0 'Lalor (1932),
279 Mass. 10 [180 N.E. 525]; Moschella v. Kilderry (1935),
290 Mass. 62 [194 N.E. 728]; Novo v. E'f!'Lployers' Liability
Assur. Corp. (1936), 295 Mass. 232 [3 N.E~2d 737]; Woznicki
v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1938), 299 Mass. 244 [12 N.E.2d 876];
Kneeland v. Berna1·di (1945), 317 Mass. 517 [58 N.E.2d 823];
Locke v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. (1938), 227
Wis. 489 [279 N.W. 55], and cases cited at p. 58 [of 279
N.W.].)
[lb] The plaintiffs urge that an affirmance of the judgment
would create inconsistency in the construction of language
under the statutory provisions and under the insurance policy.
As the foregoing indicates, there is no merit in this contention. The matter of the owner's imputed liability is not involved here; and the question of the operator's coverage under
the owner's policy was not involved in the Souza case. Since
there is neither express nor implied permission for Irvin's
use of the automobile, he is not protected by the omnibus
clause in the policy of the owner.
It follows that the trial court correctly concluded that the
plaintiff, Irvin Victor Norris, was not an additional assured
under the omnibus clause of Pacific's policy to Parkford, and
that this conclusion supports the judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The facts are clear. Parkford owned a Plymouth automobile. His public liability insurance carrier is Pacific Indemnity Company, called Pacific. The policy issued by Pacific
insured, as required by law (Veh. Code,§ 415(a) (2)) in addition to Parkford "any other person using or responsible for
the use of [the car] . . . with the express or implied permission of [Parkford]." Parkford permitted his son, Geof-
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frey, to use the car but instructed him not to permit anyone
else to use it. Geoffrey permitted Irvin Norris to use it, and
in the course thereof, an injury was caused to the Phillipsons,
allegedly through Irvin's negligence. Irvin would be liable
as the driver of the car and the question is whether he was
operating it with the implied consent or permission of Parkford and hence was covered by the insurance policy extending coverage to persons using the car with Parkford 's consent. That he was covered should be clear. In order to
give meaning and effect to this court's decision in Souza v.
Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861], that
result is imperative. We there considered section 402 of the
Vehicle Code, which imposes liability upon the owner of a
vehicle for an injury caused by the negligence of one operating it with the owner's ''express or implied'' permission. We
there held, as the majority opinion here concedes, that the
owner was liable for an injury caused by a person driving
with the permission of the owner's permittee even though
the owner had expressly forbidden his permittee to let another operate the car. As stated in the majority opinion, we
held that ''the liability pursuant to section 402 must be imputed to the owner whenever it appeared that there was an
initial permission for its use although restrictions on delegation of that use were violated.'' To the same effect are Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal.2d 320 [158 P.2d 393, 159 A.L.R. 1304] ;
Herbert v. Cassinelli, 73 Cal.App.2d 277 [166 P.2d 377], and
Haggard v. Frick, 6 Cal.App.2d 392 [44 P.2d 447].
I have heretofore stated the terms of the clause of the
policy here involved. It will be noted that the language is
identical with that in section 402 considered in the Souza
and Iother cases, supra. It should therefore be given the same
meaning, and if there is liability on the owner under section
402, there should likewise be Jiability under the policy. The
policy was written to meet certain conditions of liability and
should be interpreted in the light of those conditions. The
purpose of the policy was to protect another who was operating the car where he was made responsible by law. Persons who could make the owner liable because they operated
the car with implied permission under section 402, must neces~arily be other persons who, under the policy, are driving
~with the implied permission of the owner. If the operator
is said to have implied permission in one case he also has
it in the other. The law stated in the Souza and other cases,
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supra, construing section 402 is read into and becomes a part
of the policy~the contract for ''. . . all applicable laws in
existence when an agreement is made necessarily enter into
it and form a part of it as fully as if they were expressly
referred to and incorporated in its terms. Section 1656 of
the Civil Code states that 'All things that in law or usage
are considered as incidental to a contract, or as necessary
to carry it into effect, are implied therefrom, unless some of
them are expressly mentioned therein, when all other things
of the same class are deemed to be excluded.' Section 1646
of the Civil Code reads as follows: 'A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where
it is to be performed; or, if it does not indicate a place of
performance, according to the law and usage of the place
where it is made.' Hence, the courts must read as a part
of a contract the laws of the state existing at the time it was
made. ' It is to be construed according to the lex loci rei sitae
as to the sufficiency of its formal execution and as to the
interpretation of its parts. It would be idle for the parties
to say, expressly, that they incorporate into their agreement
the law then existing. The parties are presumed to have
had the law in view, although sometimes the terms of the
contract will rebut this presumption. This rule, of course,
applies as well to constitutional provisions as to statutes.''
(6 Cal.Jur. 310.)
It should further be noted that the clause of the policy
involved is one required by statute to present. It commands
that the policy must "insure the person named therein and
any other person using or responsible for the use of said
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied
permission of said assured." (Veh. Code, § 415 (a) (2).) That
section and section 402 are all part of division VII of the
Vehicle Code, the first chapter of which declares the civil
liability including that of the owner ( § 402), the second,
financial responsbility, and the third, security following the
accident. All of those provisions should be read together
and harmonized. Thus, when the first chapter imposes liability on the owner for the negligent operation of a car by
the one to whom he has given implied permission to use it,
and this court interprets that to extend to the operation by
a permittee of the permittee, although the latter permission
is forbidden by the owner, the second chapter which requires
an insurance policy to cover persons who operate the car
with the owner's implied 0onsent, should be simihrrly inter.
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preted. Otherwise the policy requirement does not give the
coverag·e demanded by the second chapter ( § 415).
It is my opinion that this case was correctly decided by
the opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding ,Justice Moore and
concurred in by Mr. Justice McComb when this case was
before the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division
'l'wo (Cal.App.), 237 P.2(1 666, and would therefore, reverse
the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September
Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
shmtld be granted.

4, 1952.

[L. A. No. 22258. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1952.]

D. L. GODBEY & SONS CONSTRUC'riON COMPANY (a
Corporation), Appellant, v. BEN C. DEANE et al., Respondents.
[1] Contracts-Modification-Consideration.-Where oral modification of written contract for cement work is made before
performance is started, the substitution of new rights and
duties based on a new method of computing the quantity of
concrete is adequate consideration for relinquishment of reciprocal rights of the parties under the old.
[2] !d.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Civ. Code, § 1698, relating to modification of written contracts, invalidates oral
contracts of modification that are unexecuted and validates
executed agreements that might otherwise fail for lack of
consideraion.
[3] !d.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Since in such cases as
agreements to accept less than is due under the terms of a
written contract, or to accept performance at a later date
than provided in the writing, the modification agreement requires no additional act or forbearance on the part of the
obligor, it can only be executed to the extent that the obligee
accepts performance in accordance with its terms.
[4] !d.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Where there is consideration for an oral agreement modifying a written contract,

~

[1] See Cal.Jur., Contracts, § 227; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 407.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 191; [2, 4] Contracts,
189; [3] Contracts, § 190.

